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The Terrain Of The Middle Ground

On June 12, 2025, the 193-member UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution, urging both Israel and the Palestinian Hamas Movement to declare an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire. At the same time, the UNGA placed a demand for an immediate, dignified and unconditional release of prisoners held by Hamas and other groups. A total of 149 votes were cast in favour of this important UN resolution, with 12 voting against and 19 abstaining. India is one of those 19 countries. India also refused to join SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) condemnation of Israel’s attacks on Iran on June 14. Instead, the Government of India called on the warring parties to resolve the crisis through dialogue and diplomacy on both the occasions. It may be noted that Iran, in a rare exception, opened its airspace for India on June 20 to facilitate the evacuation of around 1,000 students, amid its conflict with Israel. The question arises here: Why did New Delhi suddenly change its policy towards Tehran with which it has maintained cordial ties for so long?

The Narendra Modi Administration has also made a significant change in India’s decades-old Palestine policy. Modi’s India has decided to avoid taking sides in case of a conflict that is beyond its control. It may be noted that India has backed the sovereignty of Palestine since its independence on August 15, 1947. It was one of the first non-Arab nations to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1974 and the State of Palestine in 1988. At that time, India voted in favour of most of the pro-Palestinian resolutions at the UN. Although New Delhi has expressed serious concern over the current situation in Gaza, it is yet to directly condemn the Israeli atrocities in the Palestinian territory.

Interestingly, India and Israel established full diplomatic relations on January 29, 1992. Since then, New Delhi has gradually strengthened its diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv. Analysts are of the opinion that there are a number of similarities between the Hindutva ideology of Prime Minister Modi and (Israel’s) ideology of Judaism. Both countries believe that they are encircled by enemies and also want to portray themselves as a Powerful State. Hence, India and Israel have strengthened ties in various fields, including defence and technology. The South Asian nation reportedly used different Israeli-made weapons during its armed conflict with neighbouring Pakistan on May 7-10, 2025. It can be assumed that the significance of the Palestine crisis for New Delhi has changed a lot because of the current regional geopolitical landscape.

Will India follow a similar approach with Iran for the sake of its relationship with Israel? Although the Western countries have long isolated Iran, New Delhi and Tehran have maintained cordial relations for the past few decades. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei has repeatedly criticised the treatment of minorities in India-administered Kashmir. However, his comments have not affected the bilateral relationship. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India, visited Iran in April 2001 to enhance bilateral cooperation, as the two countries signed the Tehran Declaration. During his visit to Tehran in 2016, Prime Minister Modi signed a trilateral agreement (with Iran and Afghanistan) on trade, transport and transit corridor, using Chabahar port as a transit hub bypassing Pakistan. Keeping in mind all these, Tehran must be unhappy with New Delhi’s recent stance on the Israel-Iran conflict.

The geopolitical significance of the shift in India’s diplomatic position could be enormous. There are about nine million Indian expatriates in West Asia from whom New Delhi receives a huge amount of foreign currencies. Before President Donald John Trump imposed sanctions on Iran after withdrawing the US from the Iranian nuclear deal in 2017, the Islamic Republic was India’s third-largest oil supplier. However, the cessation of crude oil imports from Iran prompted India to look for alternatives in 2018-19.

There are concerns about Chabahar port, too. The Iranian port, developed with Indian investment, is indeed seen as a strategic counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar port that is heavily backed by China. New Delhi has already invested a huge amount of money in the construction of this port, a joint venture between India and Iran, in the Gulf of Oman. After becoming the US President for the second time, Trump put Iran under tremendous economic pressure by imposing fresh sanctions. If the Chabahar project is disrupted because of Iran’s economic situation and regional instability, India could suffer a major loss. At the same time, China could benefit a lot by taking advantage of that opportunity.

India can enjoy a lot of advantages in the future, especially in the defence sector, by maintaining close ties with Israel. However, it would hurt India’s strategic interests in West Asia. Can New Delhi afford to pay such a heavy price for following the middle path?

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